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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Manufacturer Held Not Re-
sponsible For Dealer Created Defects.
Mayrath Company was a manufacturer of certain component parts
which could be assembled into a conveyor-like grain elevator system
meeting the needs of virtually any farmer. In that the requirements of
different farmers in regard to the final configuration and power source
for their particular elevator systems could differ materially, Mayrath did
not assemble the elevator system itself. It sold the component parts to
independent farm supply dealers who, in dealing directly with farmers,
could more easily satisfy their customers' needs by assembling the ele-
vator systems according to the specifications of the purchasing farmers.
One of the independent dealers with which Mayrath did business was
Elmer Kehrer. Kehrer sold an elevator system composed exclusively of
Mayrath parts to a farmer named Lawrence Jansen. The system which
Kehrer assembled for Jansen did not have an internal motor as its
power source, but rather relied on the power system of a farm tractor.
When an elevator system was powered by an internal motor, there were
no exposed moving parts. When a tractor was used as the power source
for an elevator system, the tractor's power take off device was attached
to the system by means of a drive shaft connected to a universal joint
and held in place by a cotter pin. While Mayrath offered a safety
shield in its line of component parts, it was possible to operate the ele-
vator system without using the safety shield. If a dealer assembled a
tractor powered elevator system without attaching the safety shield, then
the drive shaft and cotter pin would both be exposed. Kehrer did not
attach a safety shield to the system sold to Jansen.
Two years after Jansen purchased the elevator system from Kehrer,
Donald Willeford, a twelve year old boy working for Jansen, was
operating the tractor being used to generate power for the elevator
system. Willeford had been warned several times by Jansen and his
fellow employees to stay away from the exposed drive shaft. How-
ever, he somehow became entangled in the exposed drive shaft and
suffered the loss of his leg. Subsequently he brought suit against
Mayrath with counts sounding in strict liability in tort and negligence
in design. Willeford alleged that Mayrath had marketed an unreason-
ably dangerous elevator system in that it could be made operational
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without requiring that the safety shield be attached so as to negate the
dangers presented by the exposed drive shaft and cotter pin. He also
alleged that Mayrath was negligent in failing to attach a warning of
the dangers of a system which relied on a tractor as its power source.
The Circuit Court of Coles County gave judgment for the plaintiff
in the amount of over $100,000.1 The defendant appealed and the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed. The court,
with each Justice writing an opinion, found that no defective condition
existed in the elevator system when it left Mayrath's control; for the
elevator system, as a product, did not come into existence until it was
assembled by the independent dealer. 2  Citing prior Illinois law in the
area of strict liability, the court found that the plaintiff held the burden
of proof to show that the product was unreasonably dangerous when it
left Mayrath's control and that he had failed to make this showing.
STRICT LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS
Products liability has evolved to the point where there is no longer
any need to prove a contractual relationship between the injured
party and the manufacturer, or any fault on the part of the manufacturer.
The landmark case establishing this "strict liability in tort" was Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' where Mr. Justice Traynor clearly
stated that "(t)he liability is not one governed by the law of contract
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."14  § 402A of the
Restatement of Torts (Second) and the accompanying comments con-
cur in this view.'
Illinois adopted strict liability in tort in 1965 when the Supreme
1. The appeal was from a judgment for $107,875.59 on a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff as damages for his personal injuries, the set amount being the amount of the
verdict less credit given the defendant for the amount plaintiff received on a covenant
not to sue another person.
2. Willeford v. Mayrath Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 357, 287 N.E.2d 502 (1972).
3. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
4. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
5. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller [includes "manufacturer" per comment
f (1965)] of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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Court handed down its decision in Suvada v. White Motor Co.6 Suvada
had purchased a used truck from White Motor Company, which con-
tained a braking system manufactured by Bendix-Westinghouse Air
Brake Company. This braking system failed and the truck collided
with a bus, causing injuries to both the bus and its passengers. The
court, in holding Bendix liable, based its decision to allow recovery
by way of strict liability in tort squarely on public policy considerations.
In reaching its decision to extend the doctrine as it existed for food'
to other products, the court stated:
[I]t seems obvious that public interest in human life and health,
the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the
justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reap-
ing the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving
motor vehicles and other products, where the defective condition
makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user, as they are in
food cases.8
This holding did not make a manufacturer an absolute insurer.' The
court held that plaintiffs still must prove that their injury or damages
resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an
unreasonably dangerous one, and that the condition existed at the time
the product left the manufacturer's control.1"
Illinois courts have also had occasion to consider whether or not any
positive defenses were to be available to manufacturers sued under the
strict liability doctrine set forth in Suvada. These defenses were set
down by the Illinois Supreme Court in Williams v. Brown Manufacturing
Co.1 In Williams the operator of a trenching machine was injured when
the machine bucked and unexpectedly jumped back, knocking the
operator down and running over him. The manufacturer argued that
the accident was caused by an improper adjustment of the drive belt
and the court agreed. In remanding the case, the court held that re-
covery would be barred to plaintiffs "who 'misuse' a product-use it
for a purpose neither intended nor 'forseeable' (objectively reasonable)
by the defendant."12 The court further stated:
We emphasize that 'assumption of risk' is an affirmative defense
6. 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
7. Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915);
Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 I1. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947);
PROSSER, THE LAw or TORTS § 97 (4th ed. 1971).
8. 32 Ill.2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
9. Warner v. Kewanee Machinery & Conveyor Co., 411 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1969);
Van Dorpe v. Koyker Farm Imp. Co., 427 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1970); Neusus v. Spon-
holtz, 369 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966).
10. 32 Il1.2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
11. 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
12. Id. at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
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. . .which may be asserted in a strict liability action notwith-
standing the absence of any contractual relationship between the
parties.' 3
It was also found that the test to be used in determining whether the
user assumed the risk would be a subjective one based upon the user's
knowledge, experience, and appreciation of the danger rather than that
of the reasonably prudent man.' 4
The same Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court that decided
Willeford had earlier held in favor of a defendant manufacturer on the
basis of the fact that a plaintiff's actions, rather than an alleged defective
condition of the product, was the proximate cause of the accident. In
Brandenburg v. Weaver Manufacturing Co.,1" a mechanic was injured
when a car fell off of the jack that was supporting it. The jack was an
experimental model and the mechanic had failed to use safety stands,
although it was determined that he had knowledge of their necessity.
The court held that the proximate cause of this accident was the
mechanic's failure to use safety stands and that the product was not
defective.' 6 Thus the Brandenburg court had applied the defense of
assumption of risk under the proximate cause label.
As indicated in the discussion of Williams, Illiniois has also adopted
the defense of misuse of the product in strict liability cases. In Lewis
v. Stran-Steel Corp., 7 the Appellate Court for the First District ex-
amined this defense. A bundle of steel flooring sheets, bound together
with steel straps, fell apart when a fork lift truck drove over a large
hole in the floor of a warehouse. The sheets slid off the pile, and injured
the plaintiff. Mr. Justice Smith held that it was not forseeable to the
manufacturer that a forklift truck would be driven over holes and thus
the manufacturer could not be held liable for injuries. He found that
such an operation of the truck constituted a mishandling of the prod-
uct. Mr. Justice Trapp, who also sat on the Willeford court, held that
there was no unreasonably dangerous condition in the product that was
unknown to its operator and thus there could be no liability in the
manufacturer. In his concurring opinion,'8 he put special emphasis on
the point that the unreasonably dangerous condition must be latent and
unknown to the user.
The Lewis decision made a further contribution to the present state of
the law of products liability in Illinois in that the plaintiff had been an
13. Id. at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
14. Id.
15. 77 Ill. App. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966).
16. Id. at 379, 222 N.E.2d at 350.
17. 6 Ill. App. 3d 142, 285 N.E.2d 631 (1972).
18. Id. at 153, 285 N.E.2d at 638.
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innocent bystander. It had been held that an innocent bystander could
recover from a manufacturer in White v. Jeffrey-Galion, Inc.19  How-
ever, subsequent to White, there remained uncertainty as to whether a
manufacturer could assert a positive defense relating to the actions of
the user in defeating recovery by the bystander.20 Both of the bases for
the Lewis decision allow the manufacturer to assert a positive defense
against a bystander based on the actions and knowledge of the user.
The mishandling, which provided the basis for the finding of Mr. Justice
Smith, was perpetrated by the forklift driver who was not injured. The
fact that the hazard was patent, which provided the basis of the con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Trapp, may also be said to relate to the
knowledge of the user. Knowledge of the dangerous condition of the
bundle of steel cannot be imputed to the bystander since he did not see
the bundle prior to the time it fell on him. Still the court denied the
bystander a recovery. The two opinions in Lewis then stand as authority
for the proposition that the actions by a product user can serve to cut off
the liability of the manufacturer to innocent third parties if the user had
assumed some risk or had mishandled the product.
THE Willeford DECISION
After setting forth the plaintiff's theories and the facts, Mr. Justice
Richards, writing for the court, entered a discussion concerning the
testimony at trial. He stated that the expert testimony offered by the
plaintiff had failed to show that a tractor powered elevator system
equipped with a safety shield would not have protected Willeford from
the injury he ultimately suffered. Indeed, in his opinion, the testimony
showed that the Mayrath safety shield would have prevented the injury.
When this fact had been established, he stated that the cornerstone
of the plaintiff's case, in either strict tort liability or negligence in
design, hinged on the resolution of the question of whether the Mayrath
products were in defective or unreasonably dangerous condition when
they left Mayrath's control. But, before this question could be answered,
he felt that a preliminary inquiry was necessary in order to determine
exactly what the Mayrath product was. The plaintiff had alleged that
Mayrath was the manufacturer of the elevator system and thus bore
the responsibility for any unreasonably dangerous conditions inhering
in its manufacturer. Mr. Justice Richards, however, did not adopt the
plaintiff's view.
He found that Mayrath manufactured only the component parts of
19. 326 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
20. See Comment, 3 LoY. (Cmr.) U.L.J. 421 (1972).
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the product and could not be said to have manufactured the elevator
system. It was his view that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden
of proof in showing that the Mayrath products were unreasonably
dangerous when they left its control. He stated that the elevator system
did not come into existence until it was assembled by Kehrer according
to the specifications submitted by Jansen. He found further that
Kehrer did know of the importance of attaching the safety shield and
that Mayrath had no control over Kehrer. Thus he held that the plain-
tiffs strict liability action had to fail as a matter of law. In reaching
this conclusion, he stated:
As to plaintiff's allegation that the defendant manufactured the
elevator with no guard over the universal joint, in view of the facts
above recited, as the elevator was assembled from the stock of
parts kept on hand by Kehrer which included a guard, it would
seem just as reasonable to contend that the defendant manu-
factured the elevator with a guard over the universal joint as not. 2 '
With the strict liability issue resolved in favor of the defendant, Mr.
Justice Richards then focused on the plaintiffs negligence claims. The
plaintiff had argued that Mayrath was negligent in its design in failing
to make the safety shield an integral part of the tractor powered elevator
system. Mr. Justice Richards found this argument unconvincing for,
even if such a design was held to be one in violation of a duty owed by
Mayrath to Willeford, Willeford had failed to show that this breach of
duty was the proximate cause of his injuries. The plaintiff further
argued that the design was unsafe in that it was possible to operate the
elevator without the shield. Mr. Justice Richards considered this the-
ory to be inadequate in that it was tantamount to arguing that manufac-
turers have a duty to design accident-proof products. He cited several
authorities in stating the basic products liability premise that manufac-
turers will not be found to have a duty to design accident proof ma-
chines.22
Mr. Justice Richards also dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the
defendant had been negligent in failing to attach a written warning to
the parts used in a tractor powered elevator system whereby its users
would realize the importance of the safety shield and the inherent danger
of the system lacking such a shield. This argument was held to fail
due to the testimony brought forth at the trial whereby it was established
that the plaintiff had been warned on several occasions to avoid any
contact with the exposed moving parts of the elevator system.23
21. Willeford v. Mayrath Co., 7 Ill. App.3d 357, 361, 287 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1972).
22. Neusus v. Sponholtz, 369 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966).
23. Wifleford v. Mayrath Co., 7 Il1. App.3d 357, 363, 287 N.E.2d 502, 506 (1972).
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Thus Mr. Justice Richards had effectively held against the plaintiff
on the appeal and had reversed the verdict reached at the trial court.
However, he did not end his opinion at this point. He continued his
discussion in order to show that persons injured by products that were
marketed in a manner similar to that utilized by Mayrath would not
necessarily be left without a remedy. Even if these persons were unable
to prove that the unassembled component parts were unreasonably
dangerous when they left the manufacturer's control, Mr. Justice
Richards argued that they could still receive compensation if they were
able to show that a part further down the marketing chain was responsible
for creating the defect which ultimately caused their injuries. He
based this argument in large part upon the rationale used by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,24 wherein that
court absolved a manufacturer from liability after finding the defective
condition was not in existence at the time the product left the manu-
facturer's control but rather had been created by the party who installed
the manufacturer's product in a home without taking the appropriate
safety measures which were known to it. By noting in his opinion that
Kehrer had knowledge of the dangers presented as a result of his failure
to attach a safety shield to the elevator system, Mr. Justice Richards left
a strong implication that he felt Kehrer bore the legal responsibility for
Willeford's injuries.2"
Mr. Justice Trapp, while concurring in Mr. Justice Richards' opinion
wrote a special concurring opinion, 26 wherein he noted that the facts of
the case caused him to view the Willeford case in the same manner as he
viewed the case of Lewis v. Stran-Steel Corp. It was his feeling that the
fact that Jansen had operated the elevator system for two years prior
to the accident made it clear that he could not have been unaware of the
hazards inherent in the operation of the elevator system. In that Jansen
had this knowledge, it was Mr. Justice Trapp's contention that the case
did not fit within limits of a products liability action under § 402A
of the Restatement of Torts (Second).
Mr. Justice Craven dissented.27 He argued that a manufacturer could
not escape liability by shipping component parts. Such a holding, in
his opinion, would work to circumvent the policy that underlies the
law of products liability. In attacking the holding of the majority, Mr.
Justice Craven's main argument was that their holding, in reversing
24. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
25. Willeford v. Mayrath Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 357, 362, 287 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1972).
26. Id. at 364, 287 N.E.2d at 508.
27. Id. at 365, 287 N.E.2d at 508.
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the trial court's verdict, worked to invade the province of the jury.
It was his position that the proximate cause issue had been submitted
to the jury and that they had ruled in the plaintiff's favor on that issue.
He put no emphasis on the fact that Mayrath marketed a safety shield
as a standard part of its tractor powered elevator system, noting that the
evidence adduced at the trial had clearly established the fact that the
incorporation of a shield as an integral part of the system would have
eliminated any danger from the exposed moving parts. It was his con-
tention, then, that the Mayrath parts were unreasonably dangerous in
that an improper assembly could render the entire grain elevator system
unreasonably dangerous.
Having laid this foundation, he cited the opinion of the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court for the First District in Rivera v. Rockford Machine &
Tool Co.,28 wherein the court stated that the jury bears the responsibility
for determining whether a product was unreasonably dangerous when it
left a manufacturer's control and that its finding in this matter would
be determinate of the liability issue. It was his contention that the
majority's decision concerning the safety of the Mayrath parts and the
proximate cause of the accident negated the role of the jury as the
trier of fact.
Further, he viewed the majority opinion as holding that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Mr. Justice
Craven found such a holding to be an impossibility under established
Illinois case law in that case law affirmately holds that such negligence
cannot be found to exist in persons under fourteen years of age. 29
In that Willeford was only twelve at the time of the accident, it was
Mr. Justice Craven's opinion that the majority decision had disregarded
the existing Illinois law in the area of a minor's capacity for contributory
negligence.
CONCLUSION
The basis for the dismissal of the strict liability count in Willeford
was the finding that the elevator did not come into existence until
assembled by the farm supply dealer. Since this assembly was beyond
the control of Mayrath, the court found that it would not be held re-
28. Rivera v. Rockford Machine & Tool Co., 1 Ill. App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828
(1971).
29. Maskaliunas v. Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Co., 318 I11. 142, 149
N.E. 23 (1925), quoted with approval in Dickeson v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Ter-
minal RR. Co., 42 Ill.2d 103, 245 N.E.2d 762 (1969).
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sponsible. This holding creates a limit to the manufacturer's duty to
insure that no unreasonably dangerous products are marketed to the
consumer. The foundation for the Willeford decision then lies in
interpreting public policy because the basis of the doctrine of strict
liability in tort is public policy. 30
Public interest in human life and health requires all the protection
that the law can give against the sale of unreasonably dangerous prod-
ucts." Use of strict liability accomplishes this desirable goal in two
manners. First, the potential liability can serve to discourage a manu-
facturer from marketing unreasonably dangerous products. 2 Second,
the imposition of this liability serves to spread the risk of non-negligent
defects to all users of the product. 3
This second result is accomplished through the economic realities of
the modern business environment. When it is impossible for a manu-
facturer to prevent a small portion of his products from reaching the
market place in a defective condition, the manufacturer must compensate
the injured parties for the damages caused by the defects. The costs
of the damage settlements or possibly insurance purchased to cover
such damage settlements, become a cost of doing business.34  These
costs, as well as all other costs of doing business, become part of the
cost of the product and each purchaser, in his purchase price, contributes
an amount to cover the injuries caused by defective products. Thus,
all users of the product bear a portion of the cost of compensating
injuries.
The use of this public policy basis leads to a conclusion somewhat dif-
ferent from the one reached by the court in Willeford. A plaintiff
bringing suit in strict liability must prove that the product which
caused his injury was defective at the time it left its manufacturer's con-
trol. 5 However, "control" in this context does not connote "power".
30. Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Jacob E. Decker &
Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); La Hue v. Coca-Cola
Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957); Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc.,
176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
31. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
32. Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 417 (1970), But see Plant, Strict Liability of Manu-
facturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 938, 945 (1957).
33. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an over-
whelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. Traynor, J., concurring in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453,
462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
34. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 3
(1970).
35. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 1l1.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Williams
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While a manufacturer may be in physical or constructive control of
some items it may not have the ability, due to the state of the manu-
facturing art, to insure that its product is not defective when marketed
to the public. While the manufacturer may be powerless to halt the
sale of these defective products, the strict liability doctrines do impose
responsibility on it for these defects. With this in mind, the Willeford
decision can be read to hold that even though liability for injuries
caused by a defective product can be imposed in situations beyond the
ability of a manufacturer to control, the safety of the public does not
require that a manufacturer be held responsible for the actions of
independent, knowledgable dealers.
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.3 16 the decision of the California
Supreme Court was that a manufacturer was responsible for the actions
of its dealers. While the Willeford court found many distinguishing
factors, similarities do exist. The dealers in Vandermark routinely
added and removed optional equipment at will. While the product, an
automobile, remained primarily in the form it had had when it left the
factory, the final configuration was not fixed until the automobile was
prepared by the dealer for delivery to a customer. The elevator in
Willeford, while shipped in component form, was always intended
to be an elevator. The dealers in Willeford had the same broad ability
as did the car dealers to choose the final configuration of the product.
Without considering when each of the respective products came into
existence, as the court did, the major distinguishing feature between
the cases was that the Vandermark dealer failed to discover an existing
defect during his inspection, while the Willeford dealer created the
defect by omitting the safety shield.
An examination of the relationship between the Vandermark and
Willeford decisions in public policy terms results in several conclusions.
The Vandermark court held that public policy does not allow a manu-
facturer to delegate the duty to provide a reasonably safe product. The
Willeford decision modified this holding to the extent that a manufac-
turer, while still unable to delegate its duty to discover and correct de-
fects to its independent dealers, is not responsible if the dealer creates
a defect. By holding that the defective product did not come into
existence until assembled, the Willeford decision held, in effect, that
the dealer created the defect.
v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Spotz v. Up-Right Inc.,
3 Ill. App.3d 1065, 280 N.E.2d 23 (1972); Vlahovich v. Betts Machine Co., 101 111.
App.2d 123, 242 N.E.2d 17 (1968).
36. 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
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This statement of a rule of law does not completely state the decision
of the Willeford court. The court's extensive reliance on Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons3 7 indicates that the control factor is of measurable im-
portance. In discussing the possible methods the Schipper defendant,
York, could have used to influence the assembling dealer, Levitt, to
use a necessary safety valve device, the court stated:
Conceivably it might have refused to sell its heating units unless
Levitt also purchased the valves but then Levitt could readily
have purchased comparable heating units without valves from other
manufacturers. And even if Levitt had purchased the valves from
York, there was nothing York could do to compel their attach-
ment or to prevent Levitt from pursuing its own chosen design and
mode of installation. 38
The "control" that is envisioned here is the ability to influence rather
than the physical or constructive "control" of a prima facie case of strict
liability39 which may or may not include the ability to take affirmative
action to correct defects. Restating the rule of law in Willeford, as it
modified the holding in Vandermark and as limited by Schipper, it
could be stated: While a manufacturer cannot delegate its duty to dis-
cover and correct defects to its independent dealers, it is not responsible
for a dealer created defect unless it has knowldge of the defect and has
the ability to influence its dealer to correct the defect.
If this is to be the final statement of the responsibility of a manu-
facturer of component parts under the law of products liability, it is
essential to discuss what will constitute the necessary ability to influence
a dealer. The Schipper court rejected the possibility of refusing to sell
as a means of controlling a dealer.40 With a strong public policy in
favor of protecting the consumer, imposing liability on a manufacturer
which sells its products to dealers who do not use available safety devices
could be an alternative well worth consideration. The problem with this
approach is that imposing liability on a manufacturer on the basis of
the fact that he could control a dealer by means of refusing to sell is,
in effect, a penalty on the manufacturer for failure to police his dealers.
The manufacturer would probably not know of the omission of re-
quired safety devices until an injury occured, unless it had physically
inspected its dealers. If a duty of physical inspection were imposed, the
cost of doing business could force many manufacturer's to cease their
operations. Thus it is evident that the public policy of consumer pro-
37. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
38. Id. at 99, 207 A.2d at 329.
39. Cases cited note 35 supra.
40. 44 N.J. at 99, 207 A.2d at 329.
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tection runs on a collision course with another public policy, the pro-
motion and development of the national economy."
The conflict between these two public policies requires courts to
engage in a process of balancing between the needs of public safety and
the needs of the economy.
A final summary statement of the result in Willeford, in public policy
terms, is that public safety does not require that the manufacturer of
component parts, which are assembled into finished products by inde-
pendent dealers, be held liable for the omissions of these dealers when
such omissions create dangerous defects. Liability will not lie even
though a manufacturer made all parts used in the construction of the
completed product. Before this result of holding the manufacturer free
from liability is obtained, however, it is required that great latitude be
left to the dealers in deciding the final configuration of the product
and that the manufacturer not have the ability to force the dealers to
use required safety equipment by some economically feasable means.
It was the thinking of the Willeford majority that the public is ade-
quately protected in these situations by its ability to hold the assembling
dealer liable. The writer concurs in that view.
SANDER D. LEVIN
41. See Plant, supra note 32, at 947; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Dorfman, The Economics o1 Products Liability, 28 U. CmI.
L. REV. 92 (1970).
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